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TAXATION-INCOME: TAx COMPUTATION WHERE TAXPAYER REFUNDS
REVENUES PREVIOUSLY REPORTED UNDER CLAIM OF RIGHT DocTRINE.
-United States v. Skelly Oil Company, 394 U.S. 678 (1969).
In the years 1952 through 1957 the Skelly Oil Company received
$505,536.54 from two customers due to a raise in the minimum price
for natural gas by the Oklahoma Corporation Commission. In 1958
the Company was required to refund this money due to a vacation
of the increased rates by an order of the United States Supreme Court.
The Company had included the amounts received in gross income for
income tax purposes during the years of receipt in conformance with
the claim of right doctrine, whereby amounts received by a taxpayer
who claims an unrestricted right to them must be reported as income
in the year received.' The entire amounts had qualified for the 27 Y%
oil depletion deduction authorized by section 613,2 which had been
taken in prior years. In 1958, when it was determined that the receipts
had to be returned to the two customers, Skelly Oil Company deducted
from gross income the full amount refunded on its 1958 income tax
return, stipulating that it was using the deduction available under
I.R.C. section 1341 (a) (4).3 The commissioner determined that the
proper amount of the deduction in 1958 should have been $366,513.99,
the amount refunded less the amounts previously deducted as per-
centage depletion, instead of the full $505,536.54. The commissioner
was upheld by the District Court, but the Tenth Circuit reversed. The
Supreme Court granted certiorari. Held: Where the taxpayer has over-
charged its customers and has taken depletion deductions on the over-
charges, then any deduction for a subsequent refund of the overcharges
1. The claim of right doctrine originated in the decision of North American Oil Con-
solidated v. Burnet, 286 U.S. 417 (1932). For detailed discussions and analyses of the
nature and application of the concept, see generally Lister, The Use and Abuse of Prag-
matism: The Judicial Doctrine of Claim of Right, 21 TAx L. REv. 263 (1966); Corlew,
The Tax Benefit Rule, Claim of Right Restorations, and Annual Accounting: A Curefor the Inconsistencies, 21 VAND. L. Rav. 995 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Corlew].
2. INT. Rav. CODE of 1954, § 613.
3. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 1341(a)(4), states that if an item was included in
gross income for a prior taxable year because it appeared that the taxpayer had an un-
restricted right to it, and a refund of the item is later necessary, the tax for the taxable
year of refund will be "the tax for the taxable year computed with such deduction."
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must be reduced by the amount of the depletion previously taken.
United States v. Skelly Oil Company, 394 U.S. 678 (1969),"
Two aspects of the Skelly Oil decision raise important questions,
First, it can be argued that the company was not claiming a double
deduction, and that the effect of the Court's holding may be to place
the taxpayer in a worse position on balance rather than merely in a
position in which incomes and deductions are equalized, as the Court
intended. Second, the possible application of the Skelly Oil holding to
analogous situations is unclear and may be wider than the Court
anticipated.' This note will thus focus in turn on each of these two
points.
Skelly Oil Company asserted that section 1341 (a) (4)6 permitted the
deduction of the entire amount repaid to customers,7 since that sec-
tion was intended to codify prior law which had always permitted the
full amount refunded to be deducted.' The Commissioner, however,
contended that this interpretation would effectively grant Skelly Oil
Company two deductions, one for the allowance originally claimed,
and another when the full amount refunded is claimed.9
4. The District Court opinion appears at 255 F. Supp. 228 (N.D. Okla. 1966). This
decision has been noted in 16 OIL & GAS TAX Q. 12 (1967) ; 3 TAxATioN FoR AcCouNTATrs
302 (1968). The initial Court of Appeals decision, and the decisions on rehearing, are
reported at 392 F.2d 128 (10th Cir. 1968). The decisions have been noted in 16 OIL &
GAS TAx Q. 165 (1967); 43 TuL. L. REv. 425 (1969),, 47 TExAS L. REV. 489 (1969); 2
U. oF ToLEDo L. REv. 479 (1969); 41 TExAs CRTnmrw PuBnc ACoimNTANT 58 (1968).
5. The issues considered in this note are not affected by any of the provisions of the
Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172 (Dec. 30, 1969), although § 501 of that
Act reduced the depletion percentage for oil and gas producers under INT. REv. CODE
of 1954, § 613, from 273/2 to 227.
6. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 1341(a)(4).
7. Brief for Respondent at 5, 6, United States v. Skelly Oil Co., 394 U.S. 678 (1969).
8. The claim of right doctrine is closely related to the concept of the annual ac-
counting period for income tax purposes. It is because each taxable year is a separate
accounting period, and prior tax returns cannot be reopened after the statute of limita-
tions has run, that the amounts refunded had to be deducted in the year of refunding,
rather than retroactively in the years when the amounts were received. See Corlew,
supra note 1.
Because the combination of the annual accounting concept and the claim of right
doctrine bad produced several situations which Congress felt to be quite harsh when
amounts previously reported as income were refunded, in 1954 Congress created an
alternative procedure, which is generally more favorable to the taxpayer, for handling
items refunded. IxT. Rmv. CODE of 1954, § 1341(a) (5). Skelly Oil Company, however, did
not choose this alternative, but instead elected to take the deduction in the year of refund,
which is the original procedure still available under the Code. See United States v. Skelly
Oil Co., 394 U.S. 678, 682 (1969).
9. Brief for Petitioner at 22, United States v. Skelly Oil Co., 394 U.S. 678 (1969).
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The Supreme Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Marshall, ac-
cepted the Commissioner's position that the Internal Revenue Code
should not be so interpreted as to allow a double deduction unless
Congress clearly so intended." The Court concluded that Skelly Oil
Company was claiming a double deduction, and, since it was unable
to find any intent on the part of Congress to allow a double deduc-
tion," rendered a decision against Skelly Oil Company.' 2
It can be argued, however, that no double deduction for the same
amount was claimed in this case. One possible approach, which was
discussed by Justice Stewart in his dissenting opinion, is that in this
situation the Internal Revenue Code allows two distinct deductions
to be claimed.' Another possible argument is that the amount taken
as percentage depletion had reduced the basis of the capital asset, 4
10. United States v. Skelly Oil Co., 394 U.S. 678, 684 (1969). See also Charles Ilfeld
Co. v. Hernandez, 292 U.S. 62 (1934).
11. The suggestion was advanced by Skelly Oil that the very act of providing alterna-
tive methods of treating the refunded amount, and of requiring use of the alternative
which produced the lower tax, indicated a Congressional intent to benefit the taxpayer in
this situation. The Court apparently did not find this proposition persuasive, possibly
because the benefit claimed was not the benefit bestowed. Brief for Respondent at 9, 10,
United States v. Skelly Oil Co., 394 U.S. 678 (1969).
12. The Court's decision was also supported by major policy considerations. The
following passage from Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 16, 17, United States v. Skelly
Oil Co., 394 U.S. 678 (1969), indicates the magnitude of the problem which was under
consideration.
As a consequence of the broad sweep of federal, state and local regulation of the
sales price of natural gas, producers often collect and report for income tax
purposes amounts later refunded to customers. The Federal Power Commission has
advised the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, for example, that customer refunds
approaching $95,000,000 are likely to result from two Commission rulings recently
approved by this Court .... In other cases, the Federal Power Commission ordered
nearly $90,000,000 in refunds in the three year period ending June 30, 1966. Poten-
tial refunds of comparable magnitude are at issue in cases still pending before the
Commission. And additional large numbers of customer refunds are likely to result-
as did the ones in this case-from the actions of state or local authorities (footnotes
omitted).
13. United States v. Skelly Oil Co., 394 U.S. 678, 695-96 (1969). In his dissent, Justice
Stewart suggested that Skelly Oil Company had not been attempting to take the same
deduction twice but had claimed two entirely separate and distinct deductions, both of
which were Congressionally approved. One deduction was for depletion, granted in the
INT. REv. CoDE of 1954, § 613, to allow recovery of capital investment in oil and gas
producing properties. The other deduction was for refunded amounts which had been
previously included in gross income, granted in the INT. Rav. CODE of 1954, § 1341. The
difficulty in this argument is that both deductions, although allowed in separate sections
of the INT. REv. CODE of 1954, cover the same amount. An analogous situation might be
an amount which was expended for a child's medical care. Although theoretically de-
ductible in some cases as a child care expense and as a medical expense, the Treasury
Regulations permit the amount to be deducted only once, as one or the other. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.214-1(g)(1) (1956).
14. IN?. REV. CODE of 1954, § 1016(a).
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and that one traditional method of preventing double deductions when
capital assets are used would thus be at work in this case.1 The pro-
cess works as follows: deductions for depletion are subtracted from
the basis of the asset, and if the asset is later sold,1" the smaller the
remaining basis of the asset, the larger the taxable gain.Y7
The preceeding argument was apparently not emphasized, if ever
raised.' 8 Perhaps emphasis on this argument would have resulted in a
different resolution of the dispute, but, since it is possible that the
theory behind it would not coincide with the realities of the business
world, 9 the Court might well have found that the result which was
reached was still necessary in order to prevent an unintended double
deduction.
The opinion in Skelly Oil seems proper, but it also seems incomplete.
The Court leaves open the question as to whether the basis of the
depletable asset is to be readjusted upward at the time of the refund. 0
If no readjustment to basis is made at the time of the refund, then any
future sale of the depletable asset may result in an inflated taxable
gain. In order to achieve the equality which the Court was striving
15. See United States v. Ludey, 274 U.S. 295 (1927). It is ironic that although the
Ludey decision was one of the precedents most heavily relied upon by the Commissioner
in the Skelly Oil arguments, the argument suggested in the text was apparently not
emphasized by Skelly Oil. See McLane, Supreme Court Raises More Questions Than It
Answers in Skelly Oil Decision, 31 J. TAXATrIox 66 (1969).
16. A practical weakness appears at this point. In employing percentage depletion, an
oil or gas producer can take deduction far in excess of his original cost for the producing
assets. Commissioner v. Elliott Petroleum Corp., 82 F.2d 193 (9th Cir. 1936); Louisiana
Iron & Supply Co., Inc., v. Commissioner, 44 B.TA. 1244 (1941). There is no certainty,
therefore, that any recoupment at all will occur at the point of final disposition of the
asset. In fact, it is unlikely that management will fail to utilize its favorable tax position
through depletion of the producing properties far beyond cost. A profitable sale would
probably call for a price beyond the value of the properties to a purchaser. The normal
technique for preventing double deductions might very well prove ineffective in this
factual situation.
17. There is a possible objection to the argument that reductions in basis will operate
to eliminate any double deduction, since the sale of the asset might result in taxation at
capital gains rates. This inequity, however, is inherent in the treatment which the Court
has prescribed for handling depletion deductions. In United States v. Ludey 274 U.S. 295,
at 303 (1927), the Court stated that" ... the deduction is to be regarded as a return of
capital."
18. See note 15, supra.
19. See note 16, supra.
20. While it is arguable that the Court did not comment on the question of basis
readjustment because it assumed that a readjustment would be automatic, it is hazardous
to place any great emphasis on the Court's silence. It is doubtful that the Court was
completely cognizant of the basis problem and, in any event, the resolution of the question
of basis readjustment would have been unnecessary to the decision of the immediate
case before the Court, since only the amount of the 1958 deduction under IxT. Rav. CODE
of 1954, § 1341(a) (4) was in dispute.
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for when it balked at allowing a "double deduction" and to satisfy the
apparent congressional intent in making the alternative depletion
formula available,21 it would appear that the taxpayer must be allowed
to readjust his basis upward. Neither the Internal Revenue Code of
1954 nor the Treasury Regulations expressly allow such an upward
adjustment to basis, 2 however, and it might not be permitted.
The Commissioner would seem to have an argument, based on the
language of the Internal Revenue Code and the Regulations, that the
depletion amounts allowed in the years 1952 through 1957 should
serve as deductions from the basis of the oil and gas producing prop-
erties, and that the reduction of the deduction allowed for the 1958
refund should have no effect on basis. The amount to be subtracted
from basis to calculate gain or loss on disposition is the amount of
depletion allowed or allowable in each prior tax year.3 In determining
the amount by which basis is to be reduced in the event of improper
depreciation (and, by analogy, depletion) figures in prior years, the
Treasury Regulations state that the amount from which a taxpayer
received a tax benefit in the year allowed should be the reduction in
basis of the asset.14 Although the net effect of the transactions and the
21. TNT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 613(a), which authorizes percentage depletion, states
that, "In no case shall the allowance for depletion under § 611 [authorizing cost deple-
tion] be less than it would be without reference to this section." Thus, it appears that
Congress did not intend that the use of percentage depletion should result in a worsened
position for the taxpayer. Although the Internal Revenue Code is considering a different
factual situation, the section still seems to reflect the attitude of the drafters on depletion.
If no readjustment to basis were permitted, however, a taxpayer electing percentage de-
pletion could be in a substantially poorer position than one electing cost depletion in the
event of the refund of an amount previously reported as income under a claim of right.
For example, if taxpayer A deducted $1,000 per year for ten years as cost depletion, and
taxpayer B deducted the same amounts as percentage depletion, and in the eleventh year
all receipts from oil and gas production had to be returned to customers, taxpayer A
would be allowed a deduction for the full amount of his refund under INT. RV. CoDE
of 1954, § 1341 (a) (4), but taxpayer B would be allowed only the amount of his refund
reduced by his previous depletion deductions of $10,000. If no readjustment in the basis
of taxpayer B's property were allowed, he would be poorer by $10,000 in deductions
through his use of percentage depletion.
22. Treas. Reg. § 1.1016-2(a) (1957) authorizes an adjustment to basis for "any
expenditure . . . or other item properly chargeable to capital account," but no more
specific guidance appears in either the Regulations or the Internal Revenue Code.
Amendment of the depletion figures of prior years' returns, even those on which the
statute of limitations has not elapsed, is apparently not available to the taxpayer in the
Skelly Oil situation. There is no change possible in the computation of the deduction
unless the amount of gross income from the production of oil and gas is changed (INT.
Rv. CODE of 1954, § 613(a)), and the claim of right doctrine (supra note 1) prohibits
such a change in gross income.
23. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 1016(a)(2); Treas. Reg. 1.1016-3(a)(1) (1957).
24. Treas. Reg. § 1.1016-3(b)(1) (1957).
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decision in Skelly Oil was to allow no depletion deduction, and although
there was none allowable, still a depletion deduction was allowed and
taken in the years 1952 through 1957. In each of these years, further-
more, Skelly Oil Company apparently received a tax benefit from the
depletion allowed. The Court's treatment of the refund in 1958 elim-
inates that tax benefit, but there is no provision in the Internal Rev-
enue Code or in the Treasury Regulations for increasing the basis by
the amount in controversy. The annual accounting concept is at work
here; the amounts were not allowed in 1958125
There appears to be no decision or ruling directly in point on this
issue. An analogous situation, however, is the subject of a Revenue
Ruling.20 There, stockholders who had received a distribution greater
than the cost of their shares and had reported the excesses as capital
gains under a claim of right in the year of receipt, were later obliged
to restore those amounts to the corporation. The basis of the stock
in the hands of the shareholders, to the extent that it had been applied
against the amounts received in determining the gains reported in the
year of the original distribution, was allowed to be restored under the
Revenue Ruling. The rationale behind the Ruling was that the original
deductions had been allowed as returns of capital, which are not
taxable. The depletion allowance, too, has been characterized as a
return of capital," and there appears to be no reason for a difference
in treatment between the factual situation resulting in the Revenue
Ruling and the Skelly Oil situation.
On the basis of this Revenue Ruling and the inherent equity of
allowing some recognition of the total expenditure made by Skelly Oil
in 1958, and despite the technical language of the Internal Revenue
Code and the Regulations, which admittedly does not expressly autho-
rize the restoration of basis in a factual situation such as arose in
25. Treas. Reg. § 1.1016-3(a) (1)(ii) (1957).
26. Rev. RuL 456, 1958-2 Cum. BuLL. 415.
27. See note 17 supra. Although Congress apparently intended the percentage deple-
tion deduction to provide an incentive to oil and gas exploration and development, and,
although to achieve those ends it created a deduction which bears little relationship to
the investment in the properties to be depleted (see, e.g., Commissioner v. Southwest
Exploration Co., 350 U.S. 308 (1956)), there is no reason to believe that the Court will
back away from its previous characterizations of the percentage depletion deduction. In
the Skely Oil decision, the Court described INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 613, as "... the
section which allows taxpayers to deduct a fixed percentage of certain receipts to com-
pensate for the depletion of natural resources from which they derive income." United
States v. Skelly Oil Co., 394 U.S. 678, 679 (1969).
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Skelly Oil, it appears probable that the basis of the oil producing prop-
erties should be restored if the issue is raised. Having effectively elim-
inated any effect of the depletion deductions previously allowed, the
Court would probably find no grounds for refusing recapitalization of
the amounts so handled.
Unlike the question of the proper treatment of the basis of the
assets previously depleted, which it did not discuss, the Court did
consider the question of the intended scope of its decision in Skelly
Oil.2 Despite this discussion, however, the scope remains somewhat
unclear.
It is doubtful that the Court intended a broad application of the
holding in Skelly Oil, or that such an application would be proper. If
the holding was meant to apply to every situation in which the deduc-
tion for an item refunded must be adjusted for deductions which had
been taken in prior years, but in which the deduction would not have
been allowed had the amount refunded been included in gross income
in those prior years, then the effect of the case would be to introduce
many undesirable complexities into the law. A few examples of the
difficulties which would result from such an interpretation should suf-
fice to point out the potential problems.
Charitable contribution deductions authorized by I.R.C. section
17029 can be carried forward for five years if they are not available as
deductions in the year of contribution because they exceed 30% of
adjusted gross income in that year. Under a broad interpretation of
the Skelly Oil holding, one who claimed a charitable contribution de-
duction up to the maximum percentage of adjusted gross income in a
year in which he included in gross income an item which he was later
obliged to refund (and where the statute of limitations for amending
his prior return has run), would lose the benefit of the deduction in
the year of receipt, and would probably also be denied the carry-
forward privilege provided by the Code. °
28. In fact, the Court devotes an entire page of its decision to the limitation of its
holding. United States v. Skelly Oil Co., 394 U.S. 678, 685-86 (1969).
29. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 170.
30. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 170(b)(5). The carry-forward is only permitted in
cases where the charitable contributions for the year of contribution exceed 30% of the
adjusted gross income for that year. If the statute of limitations has run, the return for
the year of contribution cannot be adjusted, and the contributions would not exceed 30%
of the adjusted gross income for that year. The fact that Congress specifically prohibited
426
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A taxpayer claiming a standard 10% deduction might well find,
after repaying a claim of right item previously reported as income,
that the standard deduction which he was effectively allowed, being
reduced by 10% of the amount refunded, is less than the itemized
deductions available to him in the year of receipt. He could not make
any change in his prior return if the statute of limitations had elapsed. 1
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Stewart indicated that he believed
the holding in the case would be broadly construed. 2 It is arguable,
however, that the Skelly Oil decision will not be as broadly construed
as Justice Stewart indicates. Differences in nature between the various
deductions which are defined as a percentage of specific tax return
income figures such as gross or adjusted gross income, the language
of the Court, and the prior case law all seem to indicate that a much
narrower interpretation of the holding was -intended and should result.
There is no logical necessity for extending the holding of the Skelly
Oil decision to all deductions which are in some way related to a
specific tax return figure. These deductions, with only a few excep-
tions,m are not of the same nature as the percentage depletion allow-
ance.
While the percentage depletion deduction is a completely arbitrary
figure, most other deductions are representative of amounts actually
expended, and are simply limited to percentages of gross income, or
other tax return figures, or are reduced by such percentages. 4 Further,
the percentage depletion deduction does not really hinge upon a "tax
the alteration of the adjusted gross income figure for the year of contribution to reflect
future net operating loss carry-backs adds even more weight to the position that the
carry-forward would be lost in the case of a future refund of claim of right items, at
least if these items were deducted under the provisions of INr. REv. CoD of 1954,
§ 1341(a)(4). (Congress apparently did foresee and approve a change in the charitable
deductions themselves if the deduction were under LT. Rv. CODE of 1954, § 1341(a) (5).
See note 41 supra.)
31. See Corlew, supra note 1.
32. United States v. Skelly Oil Co., 394 U.S. 678, 692 (1969). Justice Stewart believed
that the language at 685, where the Court stated that there could be no deduction "for
refunding money that was not taxed when received," meant that "whenever a taxpayer
seeks to deduct a refund of money received as income in a prior year, the deduction
must be reduced by the percentage of gross income in that year which, for whatever
reason, was not also taxable income." See note 38, infra.
33. Possible exceptions include the dividend exclusion deduction and the 10% standard
deduction, among others, although the latter is distinguished on a different basis in the
text following note 36 infra.
34. See, e.g., INT. Rav. Coup of 1954, § 213 (medical deductions); NT. REv. CODE of
1954, § 170 (charitable contribution deductions).
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return figure" per se; rather, it hinges upon what may be only a por-
tion of that figure, viz., the gross income received through production
of oil or gas. 5 While the gross income from oil and gas production
might well be the gross income for tax purposes, this would be only
coincidental. Congress did not intend to relate the percentage depletion
allowance to the tax return gross income figure, but, rather, to relate
the depletion deduction to that portion of the tax return gross income
which arose directly from the utilization of a specific capital asset.5"
These factual dissimilarities in the nature of the various deductions
related to specific tax return income figures, or portions thereof, are
arguments against the automatic extension of the Skelly Oil holding
to all of them.
The Court itself, in an apparent attempt to clarify the extent of its
holding, pointed out a further distinction between the depletion deduc-
tion and most other "percentage" deductions. In attempting to explain
the distinction which it was drawing, the Court commented that the
decision was restricted to cases where a certain portion of gross income
would go untaxed, and noted that deductions such as the standard
deduction hinge upon adjusted gross income. The Court further said
that the decision was aimed only at cases where "the government would
always lose." Finally, the Court stated explicitly that it was making
no attempt to require the tax savings from deduction to be equal to
the tax consequences of the receipts in prior years, and that the ap-
proach adopted in the Skelly Oil decision would affect only a few
cases. 17 The Court apparently felt that the combination of these
limitations and explanations spelled out fully the extent of the holding.
Some unfortunate language in the majority opinion, however, deprives
it of the desired clarity. 8
The Court apparently intended to reduce deductions under section
35. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 613.
36. Treas. Reg. § 1.613-3(a) (1960) specifically restricts "gross income from the
property" for oil and gas wells, for INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 613(c) (1) purposes, to the
amount for which the taxpayer sells the oil or gas in the immediate vicinity of the well.
37. United States v. Skelly Oil Co., 394 U.S. 678, 686 (1969). See note 28 supra.
38. Id. at 685. The Court stated: "We cannot believe that Congress intended to give
taxpayers a deduction for refunding money that was not taxed when received." This
language, however, was apparently not intended as a statement of the general rule of the
case, but was, instead, a winding-up of the argument regarding the question of Con-
gressional intent to allow a double deduction in the immediate factual situation under
review.
428
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134139 by amounts related to the subject of the deduction which were
eliminated from income in the prior year. There seemed to be no in-
tention to eliminate all amounts which might have been taken as deduc-
tions and affected, rather than completely determined, by the inclusion
in income of the amount refunded. Thus, a charitable contribution
deduction should not represent a reduction in the section 1341 deduc-
tion4 ° if an oil overcharge were later refunded, nor should the medical
deduction be increased.
Certainly, had the Court intended to include within the scope of
this decision all items which were in any manner contingent upon
specific tax return income figures, they would have employed different
language in writing the opinion. The proper language for expressing
such an intention was available in the government's brief, where the
Commissioner asked the Court to find that the Treasury Regulations
applicable to section 1341 (a) (5) are also applicable to section 1341 (a)
(4).41 The Court apparently did not adopt this language, or this line
of reasoning.
In addition to explicitly incorporating the previously considered
limitations into its opinion, the Court gave no indication that it was
altering the previously developed case law, upon which section 1341
(a) (4) was based.42 The prior case law relating to treatment of re-
funds of amounts previously included in gross income under a claim of
right does not support a broad interpretation of the Skelly Oil hold-
ing.!' The cases directly related to the treatment of claim of right
39. INT. Rv. ConE of 1954, § 1341.
40. Id.
41. Brief for Petitioner at 21, United States v. Skelly Oil Co., 394 U.S. 678 (1969).
The Commissioner stated that both the House Ways and Means Committee and the
Senate Finance Committee, in discussing the meaning of INT. REv. CoDE of 1954, § 1341
(a) (5), noted that ... to the extent that adjusted gross income or taxable income may
be changed, items such as the medical and charitable deductions which are dependent
upon income may also be affected." (H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess. A 294
(1954); S. REP. No. 1622, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess. 452 (1954)). The Commissioner further
noted that the Congressional views expressed in the Committee Reports were expressly
incorporated in Treas. Reg. § 1.1341-1(d)(4) (1957). The Commissioner urged that,
although the situation under review in the Skelly Oil dispute was not provided for
previously, the principles annunciated above should be extended to the Skelly Oil situation.
42. INT. REv. CoDE of 1954, § 1341(a)(4).
43. See Healy v. Commissioner, 345 U.S. 278 (1953); United States v. Lewis, 340 U.S.
590 (1951). See also 14 Om & GAS TAx Q. 67 (1965).
The government contended that the decisions in O'Meara v. Commissioner, 8 T.C. 622
(1947), and Arrowsmith v. Commisioner, 344 U.S. 6 (1952), provided precedent for
the result reached by the Court in the Skelly Oil decision. The O'Meara decision, however,
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items, which were later refunded, consistently allow the entire amount
refunded as the deduction. Had the Court intended to overrule the
implication from those cases that the established procedure would
continue in any situation except the narrow factual pattern under
review, they would probably have said so, rather than devoting a page
of the opinion to the limitation of the factual pattern to which the
Skelly Oil holding was intended to apply.44
Justice Stewart in his dissenting opinion may have overestimated
the impact of this case. The final result will probably be an application
of this decision only to cases where the specific amount refunded under
section 1341(a)(4)45 has previously been reduced by a deduction
which was a percentage of that specific amount. It is not existence as
a percentage of a tax return figure which brings a deduction within the
rule of the Skelly Oil decision; rather, it is the complete determination
of the original deduction by the particular items of gross income being
refunded which brings the holding into play.
While the Skelly Oil decision leaves numerous tax accounting ques-
tions unanswered, the final resolution of these problems along the lines
proposed in this note seems both desirable and probable. If the sug-
gested interpretations do follow, it seems that the Skelly Oil decision
will represent an equitable and practical interpretation of section 1341
(a) (4) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.
dealt primarily with a question as to whether one who did not own oil or gas producing
properties could avail himself of the percentage depletion allowance, and the Arrowsmith
decision went only to the point of permitting examination of prior years' returns to
determine whether amounts were properly characterized as ordinary income or capital
gains.
44. See note 28, supra.
45. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 1341(a) (4).
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